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█ Abstract In this article we review the basic idea of the “intermediate level” hypothesis about conscious-
ness as proposed by Ray Jackendoff, then developed by Crick and Koch and finally by Prinz. According to 
this hypothesis, consciousness arises only at an intermediate-level, which lies between rough sensory in-
puts and the more abstract representations used, e.g., in object recognition. We aim at formulating a more 
specific hypothesis about a suitable conception of consciousness relative to the experience of language. 
We claim that “linguistic consciousness”, namely an individual’s conscious experience engendered by the 
processing of linguistic information, cannot be identified only in the phenomenal role played by the pho-
nological structure of language, contrary to what Jackendoff holds. Instead, we hypothesize that the top-
down computational structure required for the very possibility of linguistic consciousness is determined 
by syntax (meaning generally by “syntax” the generative system that organizes linguistic information 
through transformational frames in cooperation with various interface components). This hypothesis, we 
believe, avoids two problems with Jackendoff’s original account. 
KEYWORDS: Consciousness; Language Experience; Sintax; Ray Jackendoff; Jesse Prinz 
 
█ Riassunto Strutture sintattiche e coscienza vigile dell’esperienza linguistica. Un’ipotesi sul livello interme-
dio. In quest’articolo facciamo riferimento all’idea di fondo dell’ipotesi di “livello intermedio” sulla co-
scienza, così come è stata proposta da RayJackendoff, poi sviluppata da Crick e Koch e infine da Prinz. In 
base a questa ipotesi la coscienza emerge solamente ad un livello intermedio che si trova tra la ricezione di 
input sensoriali grezzi e l’elaborazione più astratta di rappresentazioni usate, per es. nel riconoscimento 
degli oggetti. Abbiamo l’obiettivo di formulare un’ipotesi più specifica relativa ad una concezione adegua-
ta della coscienza dell’esperienza del linguaggio. Sosteniamo che la “coscienza linguistica”, vale a dire, 
l’esperienza cosciente generata dall’elaborazione dell’informazione linguistica in un individuo, non può 
essere identificata solamente nel ruolo fenomenico implementato dalla struttura fonologica del linguag-
gio, contrariamente a quanto affermato da Jackendoff. Riteniamo invece che la struttura computazionale 
top-down richiesta come presupposto per la coscienza linguistica sia determinata dalla sintassi (intenden-
do generalmente per “sintassi” il sistema generativo che organizza l’informazione linguistica mediante 
delle strutture trasformazionali in collaborazione con vari elementi che svolgono la funzione di interfac-
cia). Quest’ipotesi, a nostro modo di vedere, evita due problemi che erano presenti nella teoria originaria 
di Jackendoff. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Coscienza; Esperienza linguistica; Sintassi; Ray Jackendoff; Jesse Prinz 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Studi 
Creative Commons - Attribuzione- 4.0 Internazionale 
 
 Marchi & Romano 
 
170 
█ Introduction 
 
THE MAIN GOAL OF THIS paper is to for-
mulate a hypothesis about linguistic con-
sciousness, within a computational-repre-
sentational framework. By “linguistic con-
sciousness” we mean the conscious expe-
rience related to the processing of linguistic 
information. 
Our proposal is based on the Intermediate 
Level Theory of Consciousness (ILTC) exposed 
by Ray Jackendoff in his book Consciousness 
and the computational mind, published in 
1987. Jackendoff’s effort aimed at moving a 
step forward from more classic compu-
tational theories, showing that his proposal 
was consistent with empirical data and mo-
dels available to him. We have adopted ILTC 
for this reason, and because it provides an 
interesting theoretical perspective on the in-
vestigation of mental processes. Further-
more, we think that the conception of consci-
ous awareness that hails from Jackendoff’s 
proposal is a sound and refreshing alternative 
to the other hypotheses floating around. 
However, Jackendoff’s theory needs to be 
updated to contemporary data and findings 
from neuroscience, a challenging task taken 
up by Jesse Prinz in his 2012 book The 
Conscious Brain. This recent reinterpretation 
of Jackendoff's ideas is mainly focused on vi-
sion and visual awareness. 
In order to show the critical elements for 
a computational intermediate level hypo-
thesis, we present Jackendoff’s original theo-
ry and its revision by Prinz. Then we discuss 
Jackendoff’s account of the faculty of lan-
guage, showing the limits of his theoretical 
proposal as a sound framework for linguistic 
consciousness. In a further section we resort 
to the  ILTC framework and provide some 
emendations  to  it, in order to outline an 
alterative hypothesis for the conscious expe-
rience of language. It is important to clarify 
that we don’t commit to the implications of 
ILTC. We are aware that the theory has se-
veral controversial aspects, some of which we 
address and try to resolve. This is rather an 
instrumental approach to the problem of lin-
guistic consciousness, in which ILTC consti-
tutes a valuable tool to inquire some general 
aspect of this phenomenon. 
 
█ The Intermediate Level Theory of  
Consciousness 
 
In this paragraph we present Jackendoff’s 
Intermediate Level Theory of Consciousness as 
it was originally formulated in 1987. We try 
to elicit its core aspects in the most general 
way, in order to allow the reader to follow 
our line of argument and the development of 
our proposal. 
ILTC is a computational theory. It relies 
on the mind-computer analogy and its core 
assumption is that the human brain could be 
considered as a computational device, work-
ing as an information processor. In this view 
the mind can be thought of as a collection of 
different computational structures. The aim 
of Jackendoff’s proposal is to identify which 
of these structures are involved and make 
possible the arising of consciousness. For the 
purpose of this paper, we have to clarify the 
kind of “consciousness” that we are talking 
about. The author makes a distinction bet-
ween two different types of mind processes:2 
those pertaining to the computational mind, 
such as reasoning, understanding and deci-
sion making; and those relative to the phe-
nomenological mind, such as perception and 
experience of the world and our inner emo-
tions and lives.3  
Only the second kind of mind processes 
are identified as elements of conscious       
awareness and constitute the object of the 
author’s inquiry. Once this distinction has 
been established we can look for these ele-
ments in the mind from a functional point of 
view, describing those computational proces-
ses, which may produce our phenomenologi-
cal experience. In his early version of the  
theory Jackendoff seems to argue for some 
peculiar kind of supervenience theory. He 
claims that the elements of conscious awa-
reness (in the phenomenological mind) are 
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caused by/sup-ported by/projected from privi-
leged infor-mation processes in the computa-
tional mind.4 In order to further specify this 
initial supervening conception of conscious-
ness, the author needs to introduce a crucial 
notion into the theory, the notion of “levels”. 
If the brain is a computational device, it is 
capable of processing information.  Informa-
tion, on the other hand, constitutes a repre-
sentation of the external world that can be 
received and processed by the brain.       
However, not all of the information that  
comes to our sensory receptors is of the same 
kind: auditory information is different from 
visual information, visual information is dif-
ferent from haptic information, etc. Moreo-
ver, even the information relative to the same 
sensory modality admits different degrees of 
organization, in order to serve different pur-
poses. Jackendoff proposes that such degrees 
of organization of the computational flow 
correspond to specific levels of informational 
structure. A level of informational structure 
is a collection of information of some specific 
functional kind, i.e. processed to different 
extents and for different purposes, which 
maps and represents specific features or cha-
racteristics of the stimulus. Levels may differ 
with each other in virtue of their informatio-
nal content (different modalities) or by their 
degree of organization (same modality). In 
the latter case each level derives its basic in-
formational input from the level below in a 
serial computational sequence. 
Jackendoff distinguishes at least three dif-
ferent levels of information processing for 
each sensory modality. A primary level (low 
level) provides representations directly deri-
ved from the very first sensory input con-
veyed by receptors (i.e. the retinal stimulus).5 
This level is supposed to be disorganized and 
not directly identifiable with the objects or 
elements of the world that are generating it. 
At a secondary level (intermediate level) the 
representation of the object starts to be ar-
ranged and organized in more consistent pat-
terns. At this point information about spatial 
relations, potential identity and other aspects 
of the stimulus starts to emerge.  The repre-
sentations developed at this level can be con-
sidered as an actual model of the stimulus. It 
is important to underline that the first two 
levels are specific for each modality. Visual 
intermediate level representations are consi-
dered to be very different from auditory    
ones. In both cases the representations must 
show a significant degree of analogy with the 
stimulus generating them, thus allowing for 
different types of conscious states._ 
The final level of information processing 
(high level) is a proper abstract model of the 
perceived stimulus. At this level the general 
features of the stimulus are stored and in-
tegrated with previous data coming from the 
same modality or even from different sensory 
inputs. This abstract model at the high level 
is not analogous to the stimulus. More preci-
sely, the high-level model involves all of the 
stored abstract information about the stimu-
lus, it is object centered and modally a-spe-
cific, and therefore it is the only one that can 
be shared by all the different sensory modali-
ties. This model allows an interface between 
different faculties (i.e. visual and auditory); it 
achieves stimulus recognition on the basis of 
partial information and facilitates integration 
with the deep, specifically computational 
elements of the mind, such as reasoning and 
knowledge. 
Once Jackendoff has established the dis-
tinction between different levels of informa-
tional structures, he formulates his most re-
markable claim: the only adequate level for 
allowing the arising of consciousness is the in-
termediate level. This idea relies on the intui-
tion that, introspectively, our conscious ex-
perience of an object is neither an abstract 
and formalized object-centered model, nor a 
blurry chaotic mix of different stimulus fea-
tures. On the contrary, our experience 
appears to be subject-centered and firmly an-
chored to a first person perspective, while 
showing a certain degree of organization and 
integration of modally distinct aspects of the 
stimulus. The intermediate level of represen-
tation is the only one that presents these cha-
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racteristics of sufficient organization and 
modal specificity. The requirement of modal 
specificity stems from the possibility to have 
visual experience separately from auditory 
experiences,_haptic experiences etc. Al-
though, our experience of the world usually 
involves phenomenal features of various mo-
dalities, which are integrated in a coherent 
scene, each of these features seems to be se-
parable from the others, in the sense that the 
presence of a sound, doesn’t entail the phe-
nomenal presence of a corresponding visual 
image or tactile experience.6 From these con-
siderations, Jackendoff concludes that the 
elements of conscious awareness must be 
caused by/supported by/projected from in-
formational structures of the intermediate 
level. 
This is a brief sketch of the core schema 
of the ILTC in its original formulation.7 Ja-
ckendoff has taken into consideration mainly 
three types of conscious awareness, visual 
awareness, musical awareness and linguistic 
awareness. We shall not discuss musical awa-
reness since it falls out of the scope of this 
paper. In the last 20 years there has been a 
massive development of relevant empirical 
data about vision; thus it seems more inte-
resting to review the recent re-elaboration of 
ILTC about visual awareness discussed by 
Jesse Prinz. This review will be subject matter 
of the next section. 
 
█ Recent revaluation of the ILTC 
 
In 1987 Jackendoff proposed only three 
different levels of informational structure, 
referring to the data available to him.8 Now-
adays, we know that there are many more le-
vels and sublevels. However, the prolifera-
tion of levels may still be compatible with a 
classification into low, intermediate and high 
level groups of informational structures. 
Thus, the very central assumption of the  
theory still holds. This is what the philo-
sopher Jesse Prinz argues for in his recent 
book The Conscious Brain. 
Already in 2007,  in  his  article  The Inter- 
mediate Level Theory of Consciousness, Prinz 
offered a review of the ILTC, which worked 
as a basis for his own proposal. Basically, his 
argument is founded on two considerations. 
The first concerns the fact that a significant 
amount of cognitive scientists and philo-
sophers are by now inclined to accept some 
form of the mind-computer analogy. The  
second is based on the assumption, widely 
shared in the community of neuroscience, 
that most of our brain faculties present a   
hierarchical structure. It follows that a com-
putational theory hinged on a detailed and 
plausible notion of hierarchical structure, 
such as the original ILTC, can be considered 
a foreseeing intuition rather than an out-
dated perspective. Therefore, the real con-
temporary issue will be to test its consistency 
with a complex compound of data that was 
not available when the theory was first for-
mulated. 
Prinz claims that, at least in the case of vi-
sion, the framework of ILTC is still plausible. 
Research concerning the structure of visual 
cortices and visual processes in the brain has 
discovered over a dozen of different specia-
lized areas related to visual information pro-
cessing.9 Moreover, these areas seem to be 
organized not in a strictly hierarchical way. 
Information, for example, can flow forward 
and backward through different areas at dif-
ferent times of the processing flow. Yet it is 
still possible to characterize a series of low, 
intermediate and high levels of information 
processing on the basis of the type of infor-
mation related to each different area or 
group of areas. This is highly consistent with 
Jackendoff’s theory, the only real difference 
with his original proposal is that each level of 
this new account involves more than just one 
brain area. 
More in detail, a viable way of characte-
rizing the three levels distinction could be to 
associate low level processing areas with de-
tection of isolated local features. The inter-
mediate level would then be associated with 
perception of more integrated features like 
boundaries, shapes, texture and color, and 
Syntactic Structures and the Conscious Awareness of Language Experience 
 
173 
with discrimination of the object from the 
background. According to this account, high-
level areas are related to the processing of 
abstract categorical information and compa-
rative features.10 This basic model consists in 
a flow of information from peripheral11 areas 
(such as primary visual area V1) to more 
central ones (like Inferotemporal Cortex IT) 
associated with recognition and categoriza-
tion. The connection between the two is 
achieved through a group of intermediate 
structures (corresponding to areas V2, V3 
and in particular V4 in extrastriate cortex) 
working as an interface from local fragmen-
tation to central abstraction, and therefore 
serving as a good candidate for supporting 
visual consciousness. 
Prinz also reports some scientific data in 
support of his claims. First of all, studies on 
non-human primates12 shows that both pri-
mary visual areas and IT are not adequate 
correlates of conscious experience. Early vi-
sual areas are not reliable in detecting critical 
differences in stimuli which are, on the other 
hand, present in conscious awareness, i.e. the 
same group of primary visual cells can be ac-
tivated in front of a spatial orientati-
on/variation in the stimulus (retinotopic 
map), or separated groups of cells may cor-
respond to features which are unified in ex-
perience.  Recognition  areas, on the contra-
ry, are  not sufficiently, if at all, attuned to 
the possible variations in the perspective 
from which the subject looks at the same 
stimulus. Such perspectival shifts deeply af-
fect experience determining core features like 
dimension, position, inversion, lightness and 
so on. Prinz suggests that Jackendoff’s basic 
intuition still holds: conscious experience 
appears to be at the same time highly va-
riable and viewpoint dependent, and yet con-
sistent and unified. Therefore, it should be 
implemented on the basis of computational 
structures associated with the processing of 
information that is neither too local nor too 
abstract. 
Furthermore, Prinz  claims that the stron-
gest  support  to  ILTC  comes from testing 
its predictions. One way to do this is by 
considering cognitive deficits related to local 
brain damage. If the ILTC general frame-
work is correct, damage in early cortical areas 
should undermine the arising of conscious-
ness and, in fact, a massive damage to prima-
ry visual cortex (V1) results in the pheno-
menon  known  as  cortical blindness. Corti-
cal blindness consists, broadly, in the absence  
of  visual  experience  with  an  otherwise per-
fectly functional visual apparatus. Moreover, 
there are cases of cortical blindness condi-
tions in which patients still experience visual 
hallucinations and mental imagery.13 Since in 
the ILTC framework hallucinations and 
mental imagery can be explained as activa-
tion of intermediate level areas that are trig-
gered by high level ones, this data is consi-
stent with the prediction of the intermediate 
level theory. 
From the opposite side, according to 
ILTC, damage to high level processing areas 
should not undermine the conscious expe-
rience of the stimulus, for its intermediate 
level representation would still be available. 
This is exactly the case with patients suf-
fering from visual associative agnosia.14 This 
disorder derives from damage to recognition 
areas of the temporal lobe. This particular 
condition allows a rather normal conscious 
experience of the environment, but prevents 
object recognition. For example, patients 
with this disorder can draw pictures that are 
very consistent with the stimulus they are 
presented with, but fail to name the stimulus 
if they are asked what it is or what the dra-
wing represents.15 In this case, the ILTC ex-
planation is that the information processing 
flows from low to intermediate level, thus 
becoming conscious, but it cannot reach the 
high level domain of object recognition 
(associated with the infero-temporal cortex 
IT). Finally, there is evidence that a local 
damage to intermediate level areas, located 
in the extrastriate cortex, results in the altera-
tion, anomaly or absence of conscious expe-
rience, consistently with ILTC assumptions. 
Although  the  evidence  proposed  by  the 
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author mainly holds for vision16, a similar 
hierarchical organization can be plausibly 
postulated for all of the other sensory moda-
lities and it has actually been partially con-
firmed by studies on the other senses.17 Thus, 
considering that the core intuitions about the 
processes and representations underlying 
consciousness may apply perfectly to all mo-
dalities, further empirical proof for a genera-
lization of ILTC to all phenomenal expe-
rience will plausibly become available in a re-
latively short period of time. 
The last aspect to be considered is the in-
completeness of original ILTC. Recent data 
regarding subliminal perception18 (and also 
experiments on attentionalblink and inat-
tentionalblindness, especially concerning the 
relation of attention and consciousness, see 
below19) have shown that a complete compu-
tational flow, from early, low-level visual 
areas to high-level recognition ones, can be 
completed without any conscious manifesta-
tion of the undergoing processes. In this case 
it is possible that intermediate level represen-
tations are still implemented, though not 
consciously perceived. A straightforward 
consequence of this consideration is that the 
activation of intermediate level areas might 
be necessary for conscious experience, but 
not sufficient. A further necessary condition 
(acknowledged by Prinz and, partially, by  
Jackendoff himself) could be the activation 
of some kind of top-down processes used to 
determine which of the available inter-
mediate level representations will actually 
become conscious and how these representa-
tions are selected. Prinz proposes that this 
“selection device” is attentional modulation. 
Although we will not follow his line of argu-
ment further, this is a crucial point to under-
line for our purposes, since we will try to   
hypothesize something quite similar in the 
case of conscious experience of language. We 
hope to have shown that there are reasons to 
think that ILTC still constitutes a valuable 
approach to conscious experience in general. 
We turn now to the core part of the paper, 
namely linguistic conscious experience. 
█ Jackendoff’s account of linguistic 
conscious experience 
 
In How Language Helps Us to Think        
Jackendoff offers his view about the deep re-
lationship between consciousness and lan-
guage. He ascribes the most important as-
pects of human intelligence, such as free will, 
decision making and all of those faculties 
that distinguish human beings among the 
other animals to the high-level domain, i.e. 
the domain of thought. In his view, thought 
processes are entirely unconscious. We have 
seen how consciousness, on the other hand, is 
located at the intermediate level and could be 
considered something not as important as 
thought, in relation to human development 
and interactions with the environment. In 
this picture, consciousness reveals some deep 
processes, which regulate cognition. More 
precisely, thought processes are considered as 
unconscious high-level processes, however, 
the output of these processes can be con-
sciously experienced, albeit only in linguistic 
form. Hence, thought itself would not have a 
conscious manifestation at all without lan-
guage._ 
This crucial claim follows from the 
consideration that we experience the output 
of thought processes in terms of, for example, 
logical connections like entailment etc. We 
don’t experience thoughts themselves. 
Instead, we construct bits of sentences and 
periods from which the deep logical relations 
are inferable, insofar as they reflect the struc-
ture of those sentences, although they are not 
actually experienced. Jackendoff claims that 
language can indirectly express thought rules 
but it is not coincident with actual thinking. 
He is aware that such a position, as held in 
1987, could deflate the role of consciousness, 
which would be somewhat causally power-
less. It seems, in fact, that this account could 
be considered as an epiphenomenal perspec-
tive. To avoid this epiphenomenal drift of 
the ITLC Jackendoff appeals to attention 
(although in a rather underspecified way) as 
the device capable of making consciousness 
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effective and relevant. Attention is like a lens 
capable of focusing on some details of 
thought processes. This is possible in virtue 
of the allocation of more brain processing re-
sources to the elements focused. It is im-
portant to note that, in this perspective, at-
tention is posterior to consciousness. It      
enhances the contents of awareness, rather 
than actually conveying representations to 
consciousness (this marks a significant point 
of distance between Jackendoff’s original po-
sition and Prinz’s later revision of it). Lan-
guage is the instrument by means of which 
attention focuses on some bits of our thought 
processes, thus making them more relevant 
for the computational system. 
We have seen that Jackendoff’s intuitions 
may still be consistent with what we know of 
the processes involved in conscious experi-
ence. However, Even if we accept his as-
sumptions and try to explain linguistic expe-
rience through ILTC, we still need to under-
stand which part of the linguistic flow of in-
formation, from perception of a particular 
kind of noises (phonetic structure) to under-
standing their meaning (semantic structure) 
is actually conscious. The question that arises 
is then: which is the intermediate level for 
the language faculty? From what has been 
said it follows that the higher level of lan-
guage processing, concerning semantics and 
meanings, must be located among uncon-
scious thought processes. Although Jacken-
doff doesn’t claim it explicitly, he points to 
the fact that we are conscious of a word’s 
being a word, but we are not directly and uni-
vocally conscious of its meaning, though we 
might be able to grasp it indirectly by groups 
of other words, as in descriptions, or associa-
tively, through images. The process of grasp-
ing meanings is a high-level thought process 
and, therefore, a completely unconscious  
one.20 The phenomenal content of linguistic 
consciousness is the word,21 not the meaning. 
Accordingly, Jackendoff himself claims 
that the only necessary and sufficient ele-
ment for linguistic consciousness must be the 
phonological structure.22 The main evidence 
behind this claim is that we can have an ex-
perience of a linguistically consistent set of 
sounds in an unknown language without   
having the slightest idea of its meaning. Thus 
semantic structure is cut off from actual 
conscious awareness of language. Moreover, 
says Jackendoff, language experience comes 
in the form of the language spoken, so we 
have conscious experience of English that is 
different from conscious experience of Ita-
lian. Meaning and semantic structure, on the 
other hand, are universal, i.e. they are shared 
by all of the possible forms of linguistic expe-
rience. One could argue that hearing words 
without understanding their meaning doesn’t 
count as a proper linguistic experience, even 
if the subject understands that what he is 
hearing is a sentence and not a string of ran-
dom sounds. We don’t think that this is the 
case and we accept that a fully linguistic ex-
perience is possible without the involvement 
of meanings, although we hold that phonolo-
gical structure alone is not sufficient for this 
purpose. In any case, if we accept Jacken-
doff’s arguments, we have to rule out the    
direct involvement of semantics into con-
scious experience of language. 
It is trivial that this claim must be consi-
stent with ILTC, namely it is required that 
the phonological structure be associated with 
representations of the intermediate level.        
Jackendoff tries to meet this desideratum by 
saying that phonology is what allows the   
hearer to distinguish from raw sound mate-
rial and bits of actual linguistic sounds, and 
conveys information towards full (uncon-
scious) understanding.23 This fits exactly the 
definition and role of an intermediate level 
representation in the ILTC framework. 
To sum all this up, Jackendoff proposes 
that we have a specific language modality 
(functionally analogue to any other sensory 
modality). According to this account, lin-
guistic processing, like all the other moda-
lities, is functionally organized in vertical  
layers of low, intermediate and high level of 
information structure. The levels correspond 
respectively to raw sound, linguistic con-
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scious experience and understanding of    
meaning and semantic relations. Language is 
also what permits conscious manifestation of 
thoughts and enhances some thought proces-
ses by allowing allocation of processing re-
sources through attention. This model is mir-
rored in vision, hearing, etc. All of the verti-
cally structured modalities share a horizontal 
intermediate level that constitutes the full 
manifestation of multimodal integrated 
conscious experience. As mentioned above, 
the modal specificity of the intermediate le-
vel is required to account for the possibility 
to have visual experiences separated from 
auditory ones etc. If only one kind of stimu-
lus is present, e.g. visual vs. auditory, the in-
formation will be processed only in the visual 
system and the output of the (visual) primary 
sketch will be further processed and lead ul-
timately to visual intermediate level repre-
sentations only (2,5D models)24. 
We agree with the general idea depicted 
by Jackendoff, though we consider his ac-
count of linguistic consciousness to be too 
partial and not completely convincing. Our 
skepticism is mainly motivated by Jacken-
doff’s undervaluation of one core element of 
the language faculty, namely syntax. We will 
now try to show that Jackendoff’s position 
might be threatened by some powerful objec-
tions and afterwards we make an effort to 
provide an alternative to his proposal. 
 
█ Weaknesses of Jackendoff’s approach25 
 
We will now present some flaws that 
might considerably compromise Jackendoff’s 
theory. The first problem to be examined is 
the dangerous proximity of Jackendoff’s ac-
count of consciousness to epiphenomena-
lism (especially in the case of language). The 
reason of this proximity is the following: ac-
cording to the original ILTC, consciousness 
seems to arise as an accidental manifestation 
of intermediatelevel processes. Moreover, 
these processes are even not as much relevant 
as their high-level counterparts, which do the 
hard computational work in thinking. If so, 
we might regard consciousness as either a 
powerless epiphenomenal byproduct26 or a 
collection of not so relevant brain processes. 
As we noted, Jackendoff is aware of the prob-
lem and tries to rule out epiphenomenalism 
by saying that consciousness does play an ac-
tive role in the horizon of brain activity by 
orienting attention. It is only at a conscious 
level that we experience the effect of focusing 
on a particular aspect of what our brain is 
unconsciously processing. The focus of at-
tention enables a greater allocation of com-
putational resources and, as a consequence, a 
richer detail in the output of the processes 
involved._ 
At first glance, Jackendoff’s reply seems to 
actually avoid the epiphenomenal drift of the 
theory, though it attributes to consciousness 
somewhat a secondary role. After a more in 
depth consideration however, it is clear that 
this solution doesn’t take the theory much 
further. Indeed, the epiphenomenal object-
tion can be restated as to include attentional 
processes.27Jackendoff’s counter objection, in 
fact, cannot avert the possibility of expe-
rience of attentional focus being itself a 
conscious manifestation of unconscious pro-
cesses. Thus, consciousness would be con-
firmed as a powerless phenomenon. This is a 
rather crucial point for which a clear and 
convincing answer must be found. In our   
opinion, the correct strategy to avoid this  
epiphenomenalist threat depends on an accu-
rate account of the role of attention and of 
the representations that occur at the inter-
mediate levels. Later we will address this 
point in a greater detail. 
A second critical point of Jackendoff’s ar-
gument on linguistic consciousness regards 
his conception of language as the only proper 
thought-accessing / thought-enhancing de-
vice. We might welcome the hypothesis that 
language provides a peculiar way of ad-
dressing our own thoughts, which is specific 
of humans as the only beings to whom lan-
guage is available. Yet we don’t see how the 
conscious linguistic manifestation of thought 
may differ in relevance from that of the other 
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modalities. By strictly following ILTC, it 
seems that every representation at the inter-
mediate level (be it linguistic, musical, visual, 
etc.), although modality specific, shares the 
same basic function through analogue com-
putational structures. Hence, if linguistic 
consciousness allows allocation of attention 
to particular thought processes, the same 
could be said of, for example, visual con-
sciousness. Moreover, we can easily hypothe-
size that some abstract relations, reflecting 
thought processes, can be inferred without 
any appeal to language.28 Accordingly, it 
seems that with a sufficient number of visual 
conscious occurrences of the act of killing (to 
use Jackendoff’s own example),29 the hypo-
thetical unconscious thought relation xf(y),30 
where x represents the visual instance of the 
killer,  f() represents the visual instance of the 
act and y the visual instance of the victim, 
could also be properly inferred. 
These instances would represent a parti-
cular case and would not be as suitable for 
immediate generalization as their linguistic 
correspondent “a kills b”, but even if this is 
true, it shows at most that language is, in this 
respect, more efficient. It doesn’t follow that 
there cannot be cases in which, although    
visual consciousness cannot “express” 
thought, it can at least make the output of 
thought processes manifest, and enhance 
those processes just as well as linguistic 
consciousness.31 Of course Jackendoff can 
reply that there are some thought relations 
that can be expressed only in linguistic forms 
like Who killed Roger rabbit?32 Yet, even if we 
accept such reply, this seems again to make 
linguistic conscious manifestation of thought 
only more efficient for certain tasks, not mo-
re relevant for the purposes of consciousness 
in general. 
The third objection, most important for 
this paper, concerns Jackendoff's account of 
linguistic conscious experience as supported 
only by the phonological structure. In parti-
cular, Jackendoff claims that the phonolo-
gical structure is the only necessary and suffi-
cient condition for having a conscious expe-
rience of language.33 When patterns of lin-
guistic sounds become sufficiently organized 
as to constitute intermediate level represen-
tations, suitable of becoming conscious, this 
happens only in virtue of their phonological 
structure.  
We agree with Jackendoff to this extent, 
phonological structure is necessary for       
distinguishing between conscious perception 
of noises and conscious perception of lan-
guage. However, we doubt that it can also be 
sufficient. The intuition behind this objec-
tion is quite straightforward. If I pronounce a 
series of words that resemble words of Ita-
lian, with no meaning or order whatsoever, 
to a non-Italian speaker, he might have the 
illusion of having the experience of a foreign 
language. Moreover, if I were to pronounce 
actual words of Italian but in a casual or     
deliberately incorrect order, he might be able 
to grasp significant bits of the phonological 
structure of that language without having a 
proper conscious experience of it.  
We believe that such phenomenal diffe-
rence resides at a level below the level of un-
derstanding meanings, i.e. it resides at the in-
termediate level. We can illustrate this point 
with another example. If a person learning 
German and find herself in a German speak-
ing community, she might be able to recogni-
ze sentences from their structure alone,  
knowing that the verb would be in the se-
cond position, recognizing prepositions     
(albeit not knowing their exact meaning 
which depends on the other words they are 
used with) and so on. More importantly, she 
would be able to do this without knowing the 
meaning of the uttered words that she hears.  
To anticipate our final point, without   
having developed a sufficient degree of syn-
tactic proficiency she would be able only to 
hypothesize that what she’s hearing is a natu-
ral language, because it comes from a human 
being. In fact, she could not tell the diffe-
rence among bits of sentences with a specific 
syntactic role. We hold that this difference in 
language proficiency comes with a particular 
phenomenal character, which is exactly the 
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peculiar phenomenal character of linguistic 
experience.34 
It might be said that being able to under-
stand the language in question is a trivial 
condition for having a conscious experience 
of that language and Jackendoff underlines 
that conscious experience of language is spe-
cific for each natural language. As we have 
seen however, here we are not talking about 
specific semantic understanding, which is 
ruled out from the domain of consciousness 
by Jackendoff as well, but of a kind of phe-
nomenology that comes about with syntactic 
structural organization alone. We think that 
this idea tells us something about nature of 
linguistic experience, namely that a conscious 
experience of sounds, to be actually lingui-
stic, requires a specific phonological struc-
ture and a degree of organization deeper 
than the one provided by phonological struc-
ture alone. Carefully discussing this point will 
be the core part of the next section. 
 
█ Some hypotheses to reinforce ILTC 
 
We are now able to provide some emen-
dations for ILTC, in order to avoid the prob-
lems described in the previous section and, 
presumably, many others. We mentioned 
that, for what concerns the epiphenomenalist 
disposition of ILTC, a possible solution 
might emerge from a deep reconsideration of 
the role of consciousness and its relationship 
with attention. Jackendoff says that attention 
is something that works “inside” conscious-
ness with the function of selecting which 
elements to process with richer detail. We 
agree that its basic function is to select re-
presentations, but we think that it plays a 
much more relevant role for consciousness.35 
According to the computational hypo-
theses, there is a stream of information that 
reaches the brain through sensory receptors. 
This information is at first processed and 
converted into low-level disorganized repre-
sentations. After further processing, more 
detailed representations are construed. This 
conception of the computational flow is a 
form of bottom-up account, to indicate me-
taphorically that it runs from the envi-
ronment to the brain. As we have seen, there 
is empirical support for a complete bottom-
up elaboration without the arising of con-
sciousness,36 as, for example, in subliminal 
perception. 
According to our hypothesis, for con-
sciousness to emerge a different kind of brain 
processes must be involved. We can imagine 
a counterstream of processes proactively   
applied like a filter on the representations 
that are being built by the bottom-up flow;37 
this filter selects the representations that are 
to become conscious. Since those processes 
are derived from within the brain and they 
work on the information acquired from the 
external environment, they are called “top-
down”. Attention is typically considered as a 
twofold process.  
On the one hand a more salient stimulus 
can automatically capture attention, in this 
case we talk about stimulus-driven (or bot-
tom-up) attention, selective attention, on the 
other hand is a voluntary top-down process. 
Prinz claims that it is this process and only 
this one what makes representations con-
scious by making them available for (poste-
rior) working memory encoding.38 We don’t 
discuss whether  attention is the only one, the 
main, or just one of the processes involved, 
but we hold that some kind of top-down in-
tervention is required for consciousness to 
arise. Moreover, it is plausible that top-down 
elaboration modifies the phenomenal charac-
ter39 of the representations it selects on the 
basis of, for example, previous experience, 
expectations and associative background 
knowledge.40 
From this perspective we can identify a 
conscious stage in the stream of neural com-
putations, which corresponds to the interac-
tion of top-down and bottom-up and ends 
with the beginning of specifically high-level 
elaborations, such as conceptualization and 
long-term memory storage. At this stage all 
the elements that determine consciousness 
are working together in real time. The flow 
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of bottom-up information is continuous and 
so is top-down selection.41 According to this 
view, consciousness is to be considered   
neither as a byproduct, nor as an amplifying 
lens, but as a critical and necessary step in the 
flow of computations, which allows for on-
line selection and modification of salient re-
presentations, thus affecting determinant 
factors like quick reactions, judgments, 
choices, preferences etc. Hence, epipheno-
menalism should be ruled out once and for 
all. 
In line with this proposal, we believe that 
a form of top-down selection must be at 
work in linguistic conscious experience as 
well. To spell out this idea we fist have to 
clearly differentiate a general auditory expe-
rience from a specifically linguistic one. At a 
first approximation, we can consider the lat-
ter as a particular kind of the former. More 
precisely, auditory processing, like visual 
processing, runs from a low-level disorga-
nized array of stimulus related features, to a 
high-level abstract conceptual model. The 
intermediatelevel of processing will then cor-
respond to a set of representations that vary 
with, for example, the orientation of the   
hearer but still involve consistent organized 
patterns. In the case of linguistic experience, 
these patterns reflect the particular organiza-
tion that constitutes the phonological struc-
ture of a given natural language. 
Hence, following Jackendoff, we hold that 
the phonological structure corresponds to 
the intermediate level at which representa-
tions serve as a basis for language conscious-
ness. However, we must also account for the 
necessary top-down processes responsible of 
selecting these auditory intermediate level 
representations. Even if we don’t know 
exactly how to characterize this processes. 
We can see that, whatever they may be, the 
top-down processes that are at play during 
normal auditory experience cannot be the 
same as those involved in linguistic recogni-
tion. The main reason behind this idea is the 
one following: if the process responsible to 
select intermediate level representations of 
simple auditory and linguistic experience we-
re to be the same, this process would not be 
able differentiate, phonological intermediate 
level representations from normal sound re-
presentation of the same kind. This is evi-
dent in the case of a person that hears two 
people speaking a foreign language. In this 
case only the top-down selection process for 
general auditory intermediate level repre-
sentation is active and he experiences the 
given language as a stream of sounds. 
Moreover, the relevant feature that makes 
an auditory experience a fully linguistic one 
cannot be a part of the representational con-
tent itself. In favor of this last claim one 
could say that the subject is aware of hearing 
a language from the way it sounds and be-
cause it is uttered by a human being, even 
though he doesn’t understand it. As we   
sketched out above, we think that this ac-
count is not adequate and the reason is that 
the two foreign speakers could actually not 
be speaking at all. They could be producing a 
series of arbitrary language-like noises that 
are completely unrelated to each other. It 
follows that the relevant phonological re-
presenta-tions have to be effectively consci-
ous in a specifically linguistic way that is    
distinctively different from mere auditory 
experience of the same sounds.  
Thus, we hold, a specific selection device 
is needed, which enables the cognitive system 
to distinguish between representations cor-
responding to appropriate streams of lan-
guage from streams of language containing 
errors and from arbitrary streams of phone-
mes or phoneme-like sounds, that may not be 
regarded as linguistic at all.42 Since the se-
mantic structure is excluded from the do-
main of consciousness for the reasons pro-
vided above, we propose that the more sui-
table candidate for this function is the syn-
tactic structure.  
Once the compound of syntactic rules of a 
language has been acquired at a sufficient 
degree, the brain can map a consistent inter-
face between intermediate phonological     
representations and semantic/conceptual 
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structure. Only when this condition is sa-
tisfied a subject can be considered to be     
having a fully conscious linguistic expe-
rience.43 
This perspective preserves the possibility 
of an innate characterization of a deep syn-
tactic structure, like Chomsky has reasserted 
in many of his works.44 It is interesting to no-
te that an innate characterization of a deep 
syntactic structure is plausible in the case of 
the acquisition of the first language, insofar it 
may well be possible that an infant won't en-
tertain any properly linguistic conscious ex-
perience until she is able to build some syn-
tactically consistent sentences. This basic 
syntax has not to be very complex; it has to 
be only organized enough as to distinguish 
whether some uttered or perceived stream of 
(linguistic) sounds corresponds to a (lin-
guistic) well-formed formula. We can now 
recover Jackendoff's account and propose 
that a subject cannot rely on linguistic privi-
leged access to his own thoughts until she has 
developed a sufficient syntactic competence. 
Such a condition works for children while 
learning their mother tongue as well as for 
adults trying to acquire another language45. 
 
█ Conclusive remarks 
 
This paper is mainly constituted by a re-
view of ILTC. We hold that, even after the 
recent re-elaboration by Jesse Prinz, there 
still needs some modifications in order to not 
be exposed to powerful objections, especially 
in the case of linguistic experience. To sum-
marize, we have proposed a hypothesis ac-
cording to which consciousness constitutes 
the necessary computational stage in which 
intermediate level representations are linked 
with high-level structures and processes and 
rendered suitable for long term encoding (as 
well as other high-level operations). Con-
sciousness arises when specific top-down   
selection processes are at work on interme-
diate level representations; the proposed top-
down structure required for the possibility of 
lin-guistic consciousness is syntax. Each mo-
dality of consciousness offers a particular ac-
cess to unconscious thought processes nested 
in depth. In particular, conscious linguistic 
access to thoughts (which is specific for each 
natural language) is possible when syntax has 
been characterized to a sufficient degree so 
to build and recognize a sentence as a well-
formed formula. 
This approach to consciousness, which is 
to be ascribed to the original idea of Jacken-
doff, has a twofold advantage. From one 
point of view it makes consciousness modali-
ty specific: it reckons several conscious di-
mensions, as many as the sensory channels 
interfaced with the cognitive system, en-
dowed with similar operational principles. 
From another point of view it takes into ac-
count the phenomenal experience of lan-
guage making of it a complementary element 
for the syntactic apparatus; and it makes of 
the syntactic structure a necessary condition 
for the experience of language, opposing a 
somewhat traditional view that conceives of 
syntax as incompatible, or, at best, alien to 
conscious experience. More precisely, syntax 
provides the subject with the capability to 
distinguish auditory experiences in general 
from the specifically linguistic ones. 
A rather compelling consequence that 
stems from our proposal and might be in-
teresting to inquire further is the following: if 
the external linguistic stimuli were to be in-
sufficient, or the deep brain structures of syn-
tax were to be damaged and/or hindered, 
linguistic consciousness would never arise. 
This consideration provides a testable pre-
diction that can be addressed by future empi-
rical investigation. 
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